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I. THE RELATIONSHIP OF BIOETHICS TO THE LAW
M ANY PRACTITIONERS may be surprised to find a Com-
ment dealing with a bioethics issue in a law journal, much
less in a journal traditionally devoted to issues of aviation law.
Bioethics, I however, is finding a firm place in legal discussions
as technology advances and medical propositions are con-
' See Daniel Callahan, Bioethics, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 247, 248
(Warren T. Reich et al. eds., 1995) (narrowly describing bioethics as "one more
new field that has emerged in the face of great scientific and technological
changes").
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fronted by legal issues and policy questions.2 The kinds of ques-
tions asked because of these technological advances are "among
the oldest that human beings have asked themselves."3 These
questions are described by The Encyclopedia of Bioethics as
"turn [ing] on the meaning of life and death, the bearing of pain
and suffering, the right and power to control one's life, and our
common duties to each other and to nature in the face of grave
threats to our health and well-being."4
As the field of bioethics has developed it has become obvious
that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to address rising
moral concerns.5 An important contribution to this interdisci-
plinary approach would be made by law.6
Although there are four general areas of inquiry in the field
of bioethics,7 the focus of this Comment will be on regulatory
2 See id. at 248. "[Bioethics] has reached into law and public policy; into liter-
ary, cultural, and historical studies; into the popular media; into the disciplines of
philosophy, religion, and literature; and into the scientific fields of medicine,
biology, ecology and environment, demography, and the social sciences." Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id. at 249.
See id. "Ample room would also have to be made for the law and for the
social and policy sciences. Moral problems have important legal, social, political,
and policy implications; and moral choices would often be expressed through
court decisions, legislative mandates, and assorted regulatory devices." Id. at 249-
50. See also GEORGE P. SMITH, II, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL, SOCIO-LEGAL
AND PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTIONS FOR A BRAvE NEW WORLD, Preface (1993).
The contemporary challenge of Bioethics is rather simple and di-
rect in its mandate, but exceedingly complex in its application.
The legal and ethical evaluations and constructions of law,
medicine, biotechnology and genetic engineering need to be set
within a continuing dialogue that is tied to a basic understanding of
and respect for human rights and human dignity. Moreover, what
is needed today is a new human rights debate among not only the
members of the legal community, but among scientists and tech-
nologists-a debate that would, of necessity, consider anew the ex-
tent to which the plethora of medical, legal scientific and
technological considerations of the brave new world would either
challenge or complement both the traditional rights of humanity
and those being redefined according to contemporary values and
standards.
Id.
7 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 250-51 (listing the varieties of bioethics as theo-
retical bioethics, clinical ethics, regulatory and policy bioethics, and cultural
bioethics).
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and policy bioethics.8 Through state regulation of out-of-hospi-
tal "do not resuscitate orders," (DNR orders) this bioethics ques-
tion is thrust directly into the realm of legal interpretation,
analysis, and application. The questions and policy issues that
follow give rise to the questions of application addressed here,
in a journal focused on air law. Lack of caselaw provides us with
an opportunity to hypothesize what the answer to a bioethics
problem would be when presented in the context of commercial
air-travel-a backdrop uncommon to its application.
II. INTRODUCTION
As medical technology progresses, it allows doctors more lati-
tude in their ability to keep patients alive in the most adverse of
circumstances.' Faced with this widening latitude of life-saving
and maintaining procedures and mechanisms, people are be-
coming more and more concerned with having a say in how
their medical care treatment will be handled.'0 This voice is
now being heard through the use of living wills, durable powers
of attorney, and DNR orders, to name a few. The use of advance
directives is a way for people to recapture control of their own
being-as the growing technology has changed the way Ameri-
cans are dying. "
8 See id. "The aim of regulatory and policy bioethics is to fashion legal or
clinical rules and procedures designed to apply to types of cases or general prac-
tices .... Id. at 250.
9 See ALAN D. LIEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL DIRECTIVES 26 (1992).
Most Americans think of medicine as an ancient profession. While
this is true, it is not true of the medical technology which now al-
lows us to keep patients alive by doing the work of failing body
organs. This ability is recent, originating from the massive scien-
tific undertakings of World War II.
Id. at 26.
10 See id.
11 See Louise Harmon, Fragments on the Deathwatch, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1, 16-18
(1992).
We no longer die at home. Starting in the 1930s, the locus of
our dying moved from the home to the hospital or some other
health-care facility. On the surface, it seemed like the logical thing
to do .... Dying people came to be viewed as sick people. And sick
people went to the hospital.
That simple move from dying person to sick person, from the
home to the hospital, had hidden, undreamed-of consequences.
When we left our homes, we lost power over our own deaths and
over the deaths of those we love. Once inside the hospital walls,
dying became the sole province of medicine, and this has had a
1997] 445
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The media devotes a great deal of energy in covering right-to-
die issues, putting them on the forefront of the American con-
sciousness.' 2 These issues, however, bring with them a plethora
of legal and ethical challenges.1 3 Here, the legal issues sur-
rounding do not resuscitate orders will be examined, particu-
larly focusing on the relatively new issuance of out-of-hospital
DNR orders.
Until recently, patients upon whom DNR orders were issued
were so ill that the prospect of them traveling, or even leaving
the hospital for that matter, was so slim that most doctors and
legislators were not concerned with the transfer of these DNR
orders outside of hospital or nursing home settings. Medical
technology and the nature of terminal illnesses, however, have
changed this. 4 Patients with advanced AIDS and cancer, for ex-
ample, remain mobile for much of their disease's progression.
They may decide, after consultation with their physician, that if
they go into cardiovascular failure, they do not want to be resus-
citated. Legislatures in many states have passed statutes regulat-
ing out-of-hospital DNR orders. These out-of-hospital DNR
orders bring with them many questions of enforceability and lia-
bility. This Comment focuses on these issues, coupled with the
jurisdictional issues surrounding their application to air travel.
profound effect on the deathwatch. The deathwatch has almost
disappeared.
Id. (citations omitted).
12 There is immense coverage of the actions of Dr. Kevorkian and his assist-
ance in suicides of terminally ill patients. Also, NBC's series ER recently dealt
with the issue of do not resuscitate orders. ER (NBC television broadcast, Oct.
31, 1996).
I" See Keith Shiner, Note, Medical Futility: A Futile Concept?, 53 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 803, 834 (1996) (in which Shiner addresses the ethical parameters sur-
rounding the treating physicians: "Maintaining the ethical integrity of the medi-
cal profession is one of the principal considerations involved in decisions
regarding the use of life-sustaining treatment. Requiring physicians to provide
certain treatment can violate the ethical integrity of the medical profession and
the integrity of the profession's judgements .... ").
14 See Christopher R. Geary, Note, Advance Directivesfor Health Care Matters: Uni-
fied Statutes Solve Many Problems, 13 PROB. L.J. 85, 86 (1996). "The issue of self-
determination as to life-sustaining care is relatively new. Recent medical technol-
ogy necessitates defining death in specific terms, focusing on brain, heart, and
lung activity." Id.
446
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III. A REAL WORLD HYPOTHETICAL
A mother and her child need to travel from city A to city B.15
The nature of their trip is not pleasure, it is pain. Literally. The
hospital they seek care from is located in city B. Hence, they set
out on their journey.
The mother calls to make reservations for the two of them to
fly to city B. Over the telephone she informs the ticket agent
that her son is ill and has been assigned an out-of-hospital DNR
order. The agent types this information into his computer.
The mother and son arrive at the airport for departure. The
mother does not have the child's DNR papers with her, and the
child is not wearing a medical identity bracelet or necklace. The
two check-in with the desk clerk and wait to board the plane.
The desk clerk prints the passenger list and gives it to the head
flight attendant. On this list is the information about the boy
with the out-of-hospital DNR order.16 As he hands the list to the
flight attendant he snidely comments that "he wouldn't want to
touch the child, let alone resuscitate him."
The child, you see, is in the advanced stages of AIDS. He is
emaciated, pale, and covered with lesions. His hair is thin to the
point of non-existence. His eyes are dark and sunken. He is a
very sick little boy, obviously suffering.
This situation presents a dilemma for the flight crew. The air-
line does not have an existing policy regarding treatment of in-
flight DNR orders. If the child were to go into cardiovascular
failure, the crew is unclear whether they should resuscitate the
passenger or honor the DNR order.
A. Is RESUSCITATION PROBABLE IN THE SKIES?
Hypothetically, it is possible that the flight crew would be able
to successfully resuscitate the passenger if the passenger were to
go into cardiovascular failure. Each member of the flight crew
has completed training in CPR (cardio-pulmonary resuscita-
tion). Every airplane that is given approval for dispatch must
contain a first aid kit and a medical kit.'7 To ensure that the
required materials are on-board each plane, a special procedure
15 The names of the passengers and the airline have been omitted for the pri-
vacy and respect of the parties involved.
1f The DNR information is indicated on the passenger list in much the same
way that a child under the age of 12 traveling alone would be indicated.
17 See Interview with Michael Smarr Haney, Maintenance Operational Control-
ler, AMR Eagle (Oct. 25, 1996).
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is mandated for kits where the seal has been broken.'" Addi-
tionally, each plane has an oxygen tank with portable breathing
capacities.' 9 Specifications for the first aid kit are rigid, 2 as are
those for the medical kit.21 There is disagreement, however,
about the probability of successfully resuscitating a passenger
without the use of a portable electronic defibrillator. An article
in the Chicago Tribune recently examined the critical moments
18 See ATR 42/72 Minimum Equipment List Manual, No. 22, sec. 5 at 25-9
(Dec. 1994) [hereinafter ATR 42/72].
Quantity indicated in the Minimum Equipment Required for De-
parture column are always required. If kit seal is broken, it must be
verified that the minimum contents are in the kit. This check shall
be performed by the captain and an "Info to Maintenance" entry in
the AML made in the discrepancy column indicating the kit seal
was broken and a complete inventory of the kit has been made and
found to be complete. The captain will sign his name with em-
ployee number.
Id.
19 See Haney, supra note 17.
20 ATR 42/72 indicates the specifications for the first aid kits are as follows:
Contents QTY
Adhesive bandage compress 1 inch 16
Antiseptic swabs 20
Ammonia inhalants 10
Bandage compress 4 inch 8
Triangle bandage compress 40 inch 5
Arm splint, noninflatable 1
Leg splint, noninflatable 1
Roller bandage 4 inch 4
Adhesive tape 1 inch standard roll 2
Bandage scissors 1
Protective latex gloves or equivalent nonpermeable gloves 1 pair
Id. at 25-9.
21 See id. at 25-11. The necessary items for the required medical kit include:
Contents QTY
Blood pressure cuff (sphygmomanometer) 1
Stethoscope 1
Oropharyngeal airways (3 sizes) 3
Syringes (sizes to administer required drugs) 4
Basic instruction booklet 1
Needles (sizes to administer required drugs) 6
50% Dextrose injection 50cc 1
Epinephrine 1:1000 injection (single dose) 2
Diphenhydramine HCL injection 2
Nitroglycerin tablets 10
Protective latex gloves or equivalent nonpermeable gloves 1 pair
Red lock seal 1
Green lock seal 1
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after cardiac arrest in the sky.2 2 According to the Tribune, only
two international airlines currently have the defibrillators on
their planes and no U.S. airline employs the defibrillators. 23
Although airlines stock their medical kits with drugs to aid resus-
citation, specialists seem to agree that the only effective method
of really saving lives is to use a defibrillator. 4 These arguments,
however, should not supersede an individual's right to self-de-
termination, especially in relation to whether the passenger
would consent to the use of a defibrillator to resuscitate him
even if available.
B. INDICATION OF THE DNR ORDER/LIABILITY FOR THE
RESPECT OF THE ORDER
This case is especially problematic as the crew's only indica-
tion of the DNR order for the child was transmitted to them on
the passenger list. Are they to trust information relayed through
a third person? If they do respect the "listed" DNR order and it
is not valid, what liability does the airline face and what liability
do each of the crew members face individually? Alternatively,
what if they do not respect the order and resuscitate the passen-
ger against the passenger's express wishes? Would the airline
and the individual members of the crew face liability in this
situation?
Luckily, this particular occurrence did not advance to the
stages where these life and death decisions had to be made.
22 SeeJohn Crewdson, Code Blue: Survival in the Sky, CHICAGo TRIBUNE, June 30,
1996, at 3C.
In cases of cardiac arrest the best hope for survival, and often the
only hope, is immediate defibrillation. But despite the increasing
affordability of portable electronic defibrillators, only two interna-
tional airlines currently carry the lifesaving machines.
One is Qantas, the Australian airline ... [the] second airline,




It is difficult to find a specialist in emergency medicine or cardi-
ology who doesn't agree that placing defibrillators on commercial
airplanes is more important than providing flight attendants with
training in CPR, as most airlines do now.
"You're going to save lives by putting defibrillators on the plane,"
declares the University of Chicago's Dr. Lance Becker, who chairs
the American Heart Association's Committee on Basic Life Support
. . . . Becker cautions that "the likelihood of being able to save
someone's life just with drugs alone is very, very limited."
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However, it raised the consciousness of the airline to the issue of
do not resuscitate orders and the implications made upon the
airlines by such.25 Other airlines have yet to follow suit. South-
west Airlines, for example, has no existing policy.26
Additionally, this problem raises questions regarding the
human dimension. What if a flight attendant has moral or reli-
gious problems with letting a passenger die-even by the pas-
senger's own directive? Also, consider the effect on the other
passengers aboard the aircraft. Is 35,000 feet above the ground
in an enclosed space an appropriate place to let someone die,
especially with numerous bystanders witnessing the tragedy?
What if children are on board? Should they be exposed to such
a trauma-people watching someone else die without taking
measures to resuscitate? We must consider the values these chil-
dren would be subjected to-would they be harmed by witness-
ing such abandonment of a human life?
IV. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: AN OVERVIEW
Measures considered under the realm of the advance direc-
tive "umbrella" are living wills, 2 7 durable powers of attorney, eu-
thanasia, 28 and DNR orders. Advance directives are a way an
individual can make medical decisions for future application.29
25 The airline on which this hypothetical actually occurred adopted the policy
that unless the passenger is in possession of the DNR order, the crew should
resuscitate first and ask questions later.
26 See Telephone Interview with Marilyn Strictland, General Counsel for South-
west Airlines (Sept. 23, 1996) (on file with author).
27 See Guidelines for State Court Decision Making in Life-Sustaining Medical Treat-
ment Cases (Rev. 2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines define a
living will as "a document in which a decisionally capable person expresses in
advance his or her wish not to receive certain life-sustaining treatments in the
event that he or she becomes decisionally incapable in the future." Id.
28 See LIEBERSON, supra note 9, at 421-22.
Assisted suicide, commonly referred to as "euthanasia," is the prac-
tice of painlessly putting to death persons suffering from incurable
and distressing disease as an act of mercy. A request for euthanasia
takes the form of an advance medical directive: "I request that un-
less I change my mind, on such a day, at such a time, in such a
manner, you will assist me to end my own life."
Id. (citation omitted).
2 See id. at 2. See also Guidelines, supra note 27.
Advance Directives: Instructions from a decisionally capable in-
dividual regarding decisions about future medical treatment in the
event that he or she becomes decisionally incapable. An advance
directive may specify medical treatment the individual consents to
or refuses, designate a surrogate decision maker, or both.
450
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Health care advance directives provide a plain-language
definition:
A Health Care Advance Directive is a document in which you
give instructions about your health care if, in the future, you can-
not speak for yourself. You can give someone you name (your
"agent" or "proxy") the power to make health care decisions for
you. You also can give instructions about the kind of health care
you do or do not want .... [A] Health Care Advance Directive is
not limited to cases of terminal illness. If you cannot make or
communicate decisions because of a temporary or permanent ill-
ness or injury, a Health Care Advance Directive helps you keep
control over health care decisions that are important to you. In
your Health Care Advance Directive, you state your wishes about
any aspect of your health care, including decisions about life-sus-
taining treatment, and choose a person to make and communi-
cate these decisions for you.30
One rationale behind the use of advance directives is that
competent adults have the right to control "decisions about...
health care."31 Alan D. Lieberson discusses an individual's
rights:
The individual has the right to accept or forsake medical care.
The concept of informed consent suggests these decisions should
be made after discussing potential benefits and risks of proposed
care with physicians. Unfortunately, illness frequently intrudes
on this process, limiting patient ability to determine or carry out
[The Guidelines refer the reader to the definition of durable
power of attorney.]
Durable Power of Attorney: A legal instrument empowering a
designated person to act on another's behalf. Unlike the tradi-
tional power of attorney, the "durable" power does not lapse if the
person who executed it becomes decisionally incapable. Originally
intended to permit financial or property transactions, durable pow-
ers of attorney are also used to delegate medical decisionmaking
authority.
Id.
30 Shape Your Health Care Future with Health Care Advance Directives (visited Sept.
14, 1996) <http://www.ama-assn.org/public/booklets/livgwill.htm>.
31 See ARTHUR S. BERGER, WHEN LIFE ENDS: LEGAL OVERVIEWS, MEDICOLEGAL
FORMS, AND HOSPITAL POLICIEs 33 (1995).
[I]f adults with decision-making capacity can personally accept or
refuse medical or surgical treatment, there should be no legal or
other reason why they should not be able to accept or refuse it
through a directive or even through an agent in advance of the loss
of such capacity.
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their wishes. When this happens, the right is maintained even
though the ability to express the right is lost.3 2
Caselaw supports this general right of refusal of medical treat-
ment. The court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz held that "[r]ecognition of the right to refuse neces-
sary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with
existing medical mores ....
Historically, this ability to exert self-determination seems to be
thought of as a benefit of being an American. John Stuart Mill
elaborated on this principle in American society:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral,
is not a sufficient warrant .... The only part of the conduct of
anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which con-
cerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his in-
dependence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign.34
V. THE FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO DIE
Entwined in the realm of advance directives is the notion that
an individual has the right to die. The foundation of this princi-
ple, however, is under debate. One view is that the right stems
from common law roots. Alternatively, some believe it is
founded on constitutional rights.
A. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
As Irving Sloan states in The Right To Die: Legal and Ethical
Problems, "[t]he common law has long recognized the principle
that a competent adult usually has the right to accept or refuse
medical treatment. 3 1 The common law foundation for advance
directives (a patient exercising his right of self-determination
with regard to potential medical treatment) comes from the tort
32 LIEBERSON, supra note 9, at 2.
33 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977).
34 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956).
3. IRVINGJ. SLOAN, THE RIGHT TO DIE: LEGAL AND ETIcAL PROBLEMS 5 (1988).
See also ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 56 (2d ed. 1995) ("Most courts ground
the right to die in the common-law right to be free from unwanted intrusion on
or invasion of bodily integrity, protected through the legal requirements of con-
sent and informed consent to treatment.").
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laws of assault and battery. 6 Justice Cardozo issued an opinion
in support of this notion that an individual should have the un-
questionable, total control of his own body, "[e]very human be-
ing of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body ....
Several courts have followed Cardozo's lead. For example, in
Velez v. Bethune, s the court recognized that a physician's act of
discontinuing life-sustaining treatment on an infant without the
parents' informed consent could be comparable to an inten-
tional tort.39 A physician is under a common law duty to provide
treatment once a doctor-patient relationship has been formed."
There are many tort cases in which a patient sued his doctor
because the physician did not solicit and receive consent to per-
form a procedure. The cases become as particular as a physi-
cian gaining consent from a patient to operate on one ear and
then during surgery discovering the problem is with the other
ear-and hence performing the surgery on the ear that needs
correction, but on which the physician does not have the pa-
tient's consent to operate. Although the physician may see this
as saving the patient money and the potential danger of under-
going a second surgery, the patient has the right to refuse the
physician the leeway to operate on any part of the patient's body
that is not approved prior to the patient being put under
anesthesia.4
36 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 13 ("The doctrine of informed consent
emerged in the courts from the tort law of assault-the apprehension of contact
with someone's person without consent-and battery-the actual and inten-
tional contact .... ).
37 Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled in
part by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957), and superseded by statute as stated
in Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
38 466 S.E.2d 627 Ga. App. (1995).
39 See id. at 628-29.
40 See Excerpts, New York Task Force on Life and the Law (DNR Orders), in HANDLING
YOUR FIRST HEALTH CARE PROXY, LIVING WILL, AND DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
269, 281 (PLI Estate Planning and Admin. Course Handbook Series No. 213,
1992) [hereinafter Excerpts].
Under common law, once a physician-patient relationship has been
established and the patient consents to treatment, the physician is
obligated to preserve the patient's life by using the skills and means
ordinarily applied by physicians in similar cases. Under such cir-
cumstances, a failure to treat the patient may give rise to the same
liability as wrongful or negligent treatment.
Id. (citations omitted).
41 See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905).
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A parallel right to that of individual consent is the right of
refusal:
The individual's common law right to exercise informed consent
before being subjected to medical treatment carries with it as a
necessary corollary the right of informed refusal of treatment.
This right may be exercised even if the treatment refused would
have saved the individual's life, in the absence of an overriding
reason for the state to veto the refusal.42
There are reasons for which the state would veto a patient's
refusal of medical treatment. These limitations to the common
law right of self-determination include: (1) protection of vari-
ous social interests;43 (2) protection of the patient's own life or
health;44 (3) a threat to the public health;45 and (4) the protec-
tion of minor children or dependents. 46 Arthur Berger finds an
additional limitation to be protection of the ethics of the medi-
cal profession. 4' Each of these limitations are within the police
powers of the state to control. 48 A state will decide whether to
curtail the rights of an individual by balancing the aforemen-
tioned state interests.
49
[T]he [state's] principal concern underlying and limiting the
right of a patient to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treat-
ment, particularly through a surrogate, is a respect for life-both
the sanctity of life in general and preservation of the life of the
particular patient. Thus, courts will err on the side of preserving
life.... The Court recognized the presumption in favor of life
by noting that an incorrect decision not to end life merely pre-
serves the status quo, allowing for possible developments that
may correct or ameliorate the effect of the erroneous decision.
However, because an incorrect decision to withdraw life-sus-
taining treatment results in death, it is impossible to correct the
decision or limit its effects."
,12 SLOAN, supra note 35, at 6.
,13 See id.
,Il See id.
45 See Exceq)ts, supra note 40, at 282.
46 See id.
47 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 21 ("Courts often acknowledge that one of the
interests of the state is the maintenance of the ethical standards of the medical
profession and the safeguarding of its integrity.").
'8 See SLOAN, supra note 35, at 7.
49 See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 622 (Nev. 1990) (holding that the
common law right to refuse treatment and due process liberty interests are not
absolute and are subject to the balancing of relevant state interests).
51) Shiner, supra note 13, at 811-12 (citations omitted).
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The courts, however, do conduct a balancing of interests that
can be considered utilitarian in intent, acknowledging a per-
son's right to self-determination in hopeless situations.5'
B. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Constitutional foundations of the right to die focus on "pri-
vacy" and "liberty" interests, and particularly on the difference
between and balancing of these two interests by the courts.
1. Privacy Interests
The tort notion of privacy underlies the principles ex-
pounded by the Supreme Court. However, as David A. Elder
points out:
The Restatement (Second) of Torts frankly recognizes that the
law of privacy is a loosely-connected potpourri of invasions of
psychic and proprietary interests: As it has developed in the
courts, the invasion of the right of privacy has been a complex of
four distinct wrongs, whose only relation to one another is that
each involves interference with the interest of the individual in
leading, to some reasonable extent, a secluded and private life
52
The right to privacy is basic in the foundation of American
principles. 53 David M. O'Brien comments:
Precisely because historically Americans have understood per-
sonal privacy to involve a "right to be let alone," the right of pri-
51 See id. at 812-13.
Although courts acknowledge the importance of life, they recog-
nize that a state's interest in life "weakens and the individual's right
to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the
prognosis dims," and a patient's right to privacy and self-determina-
tion then prevails over the state's interest in life.
Id. See also Geary, supra note 14, at 86.
Technology can sustain the life of a patient with massive and irre-
versible brain damage or failed lungs for years. . . . The value of
human life, however, must be balanced against respect for basic
human dignity. Respect for human dignity demands that medical
science not prolong life when a person is incapable of experiencing
life, or would not want it to be so prolonged.
Id. (citations omitted).
52 DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY 3 (1991) (citation omitted).
53 See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: Irs CONSTITUTIONAL & SOCIAL
DIMENSIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY ii (1980) (quoting Mr. Clinton Ros-
siter: "Privacy is a special kind of independence, which can be understood as an
attempt to secure autonomy in at least a few personal and spiritual concerns, if
necessary in defiance of all the pressures of modern society.").
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vacy exemplifies basic tenets of "the American way of life" and
vision of liberalism, or, rather, dedication to individualism, the
rule of law, and freedom from unwarranted governmental intru-
sions into individuals' private affairs. Americans' particular fasci-
nation with and understanding of privacy as a political ideal, as
much as the practical problems attendent technological and so-
ciopolitical changes, inexorably promoted litigation, legislation,
and public debate over the elusive nature of personal privacy and
the vexatious difficulties of defining the scope of legally pro-
tected privacy interests. 54
Heightened scrutiny under Constitutional Due Process is ap-
plied if fundamental liberty interests are threatened.55 The con-
trol of one's own person is clearly a fundamental right and from
this should obviously stem the right of self-determination when
it comes to medical decisions-even in this age of life-extending
medical technology. 56 This was confirmed by the Supreme
Court over 100 years ago: "No right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others."57
Justice Scalia disagrees with this proposition. 58 He has con-
structed a "bright-line test" to determine if a right is fundamen-
tal. His theory is that " [i] f there is no deeply rooted tradition of
laws protecting a right, that right cannot be fundamental. 59
The science and medical technology that would preserve a pa-
tient today has no history of laws surrounding it, as it is so new.
Therefore, application of Scalia's "bright line test" would negate
self-determination in this specific area because it would not
54 Id.
55 See David L. Sloss, Note, The Right to Choose How to Die: A Constitutional Analy-
sis of State Laws Prohibiting Physician-Assisted Suicide, 48 STAN. L. Rrv. 937, 941-42
(1996) (citation omitted) ("Laws that infringe 'fundamental' liberty interests
merit heightened scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. A particular liberty
interest will be deemed 'fundamental' if the court concludes that the right is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."').
5i See id. at 942.
57 Id. (citation omitted).
Thus, at common law, the basic right to control one's own body
encompassed an explicit right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment, as expressed in the doctrine of informed consent. Since the
common law right to refuse medical treatment is deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition, it clearly is a fundamental right.
Id.
5 See id. at 947.
511 Id. (citation omitted).
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qualify as a fundamental right.6" Application of the Fourteenth
Amendment6 in this way would be short-sighted.6 2 In establish-
ing a fundamental right, it seems the correct method of assess-
ment would be to apply the basic principles of the Amendment
to the situations we face today. Americans through the Constitu-
tion have basic rights of self-determination and control of their
bodies. This premise has been upheld by the United States
Supreme Court.63 The basic principles surrounding this should
be applicable whatever the current state of technology. The fact
that there would be a lesser likelihood of surviving fifty years ago
should not give one less control over one's own fate today.
The Court has attempted to mesh these variable principles
into a view of privacy that is compatible with our continuously
changing culture. One critic contends that the Supreme Court
in Griswold v. Connecticut4 "extended the right to privacy to the
right to die."6 This seems to be stretching the Court's holding
to an extreme interpretation. In Griswold, the Court ruled that
Connecticut's state law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives
should be struck down. True, this case establishes a right of pri-
vacy, but it is a leap in reasoning to transform this holding into
establishing a right to die. The critical reasoning in question, by
Sloan in The Right to Die: Legal and Ethical Problems,66 is also ex-
tended to the issue of abortion. Sloan equates the Court's hold-
60 See id.
Applying this rule to the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, one
could argue that the right of a competent, terminally ill patient to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment cannot qualify as a funda-
mental right, because artificial life-support measures are too recent
an invention for there to be a deeply rooted tradition of laws pro-
tecting the right to refuse such measures.
Id.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
62 See Sloss, supra note 54, at 947-48. Sloss criticizes Scalia's theory:
This argument hinges on two assumptions: (1) that one must de-
scribe the right at issue in the narrowest possible terms-e.g., as a
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, rather than a right
to refuse medical treatment in general; and (2) that a tradition
must date back to at least the nineteenth century, when the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified, to qualify as deeply rooted.
Id. at 947 (citations omitted).
63 See id. at 948.
6 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
65 SLOAN, supra note 35, at 9.
66 See id.
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ing in Roe v. Wade6 7 with this same theory of the right to privacy
being extended to the right to die.6 8 Although I agree with
Sloan that these opinions regarding the right to privacy have
medical undertones, it does not seem crystal clear, as Sloan ap-
parently thinks it to be, that the rights of privacy granted by the
Court are equivalent to the right to die. It is in instances such as
these that the state interest, which is part of the common law
formation, enters into the equation. The state interest provides
a difficult argument for those who think the foundation is
rooted in the right to privacy arguments alone.
Sloan finds a more rational foundation in his discussion of In
re Quinlan,69 in which he "concluded that the constitutional
right of privacy recognized in the contraception and abortion
cases is 'broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to de-
cline medical treatment under certain circumstances' . 70
2. Liberty Interests
The liberty right is discussed in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health.71 This case "established that a competent per-
son has a constitutionally protected liberty right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. ' 72 The reliance seems to be shifting from
the right of privacy to the constitutional right of liberty, or at
least toward a commingling of the two.
The "zone of privacy," so to speak, that is now safeguarded by the
Constitution when state action is involved has been enlarged in
recent years. It embraces not only the interests protected by the
common law action ... but it also protects to a considerable ex-
tent the autonomy of the individual to make certain important
decisions of a very personal nature. 73
67 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61 See SLOAN, supra note 35, at 11.
W 355 A.2d 647 (NJ. 1976).
70 SLOAN, supra note 35, at 13.
71 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
72 Susan Beth Jacobs, Note, Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Authorize Emergency
Medical Technicians to Effectuate a "Do Not Resuscitate" Order for Patients at Home;
Provide a "Do Not Resuscitate" Order Form and an Identifying Bracelet, Anklet, or Neck-
lace to be Worn by Patients at Home; Provide for Notification or Revocation of Cancellation
of a "Do Not Resuscitate" Order, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 223, 224 (1995). See also
MEISEL, supra note 35, at 63 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director
signaled a shift away from the right of privacy to the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of personal liberty as a basis for the right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment .. ").
73 W. PAGE KEFTON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 866
(5th ed. 1984); see also DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY 6 (1991).
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Do not resuscitate orders fall under the guise of advance
directives. 4
Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) Order: A directive by a physician to
withhold cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event that a pa-
tient experiences cardiac or respiratory arrest.
75
The issue of DNR orders arises when a terminally ill patient goes
into cardio-pulmonary failure. Unless a DNR order has been
implemented, it is normal procedure for medical personnel to
resuscitate the patient.76 Resuscitation in such an instance is
typically by CPR.77 Because of the timing necessary to save a
patient's life if she goes into cardio-pulmonary failure, it is un-
derstandable that immediate CPR has become the standard pro-
cedure for treatment of such an occurrence in American
7-1 See LIEBERSON, supra note 9, at 489-90. ("Do-Not- Resuscitate (DNR) orders
are medical orders left on the patient's chart by an attending physician which
instruct other health care providers not to use or order specific methods of ther-
apy, collectively referred to as 'cardio-pulmonary resuscitation,' or 'CPR,' on the
particular patient."); see also MEISEL, supra note 35, at 546 ("[Iff CPR is to be
withheld, it must be prearranged by the attending physician writing an order in
the patient's medical record to withhold CPR in case of a cardiopulmonary
arrest.").
75 Guidelines, supra note 27, at 7.
76 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 63 ("Because patients do not have the ability to
make known their wishes concerning CPR when such arrest [cardiac or respira-
tory] occurs, their consent to these measures is implied since the situation consti-
tutes an emergency."); see also LIEBERSON, supra note 9, at 492. Lieberson cites
the 1986 revised guidelines of the National Conference on Standards for Cardio-
Pulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care:
It is generally accepted that resuscitation is a form of medical ther-
apy that, like most others, is indicated in some situations, but not in
others. When doubt exists, however, resuscitation should be insti-
tuted. One . . . situation in which CPR is usually not indicated is
the case of the terminally ill patient for whom no further therapy
for the underlying disease process remains available and for whom
death appears imminent ....
Id.
77 See LIEBERSON, supra note 9, at 490.
CPR includes those therapies employed when a patient experiences
sudden loss of oxygen supply to the brain, either because of inade-
quate uptake from the lungs or inadequate blood flow. CPR always
arises in an emergency situation, because loss of oxygen supply to
the brain quickly results in death, but not all emergencies are re-
ferred to as CPR. Only those that relate to the lungs, heart and
circulation.
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hospitals.7" As Meisel comments, "[I] t gradually became, with-
out any forethought, an accepted medical practice for CPR to
be administered to all patients who suffer an arrest and not
merely those whose arrest was unexpected and who stood a rea-
sonable chance of recovery if CPR were administered."79 Pa-
tients are not able to communicate decisions for themselves
under such circumstances, and taking the time to contact family
members would prove fatal.80 Some patients, however, do not
wish to undergo CPR."' The reasons for this include the fact
that CPR may be futile or unsuccessful. 82
Do not resuscitate orders, although ethically challenging in
any circumstance,8 3 are most easily dealt with in an in-hospital
situation. This ethical difficulty arises from the fact that DNR
orders are orders to withhold treatment, when doctors are com-
monly viewed as exclusively giving orders to perform treat-
ment.84  In the in-hospital setting, a patient's condition is
constantly monitored by health care professionals. The docu-
mentation of the "no code 81 5 is easily accessible to any person-
nel that might be called forward to resuscitate the patient.86 For
years, DNR orders were so controversial that they were not re-
corded by doctors. They were carried out when a physician
78 See MEISEL, supra note 35, at 545 ("There is rarely if ever any possibility of
attempting to determine once an arrest occurs whether CPR should or should
not be administered.").
7q Id. at 550.
80 See id. at 545-46. Meisel discusses the factors relating to the use of standing
orders:
Because of the conditions under which CPR must be administered,
the presumption in favor of CPR is eminently sensible. First, a pa-
tient who suffers an arrest is, at least by virtue of the arrest, in no
position to decide whether CPR should be administered. Second,
if CPR is not administered, the patient almost certainly will die. Fi-
nally, if permission to administer CPR is sought from a surrogate, as
should ordinarily be the case, the delay occasioned thereby could
easily result either in death or severe brain damage.
Id. (citations omitted).
81 See id. at 543 ("CPR is a treatment that some patients wish to avoid.").
82 See id. ("[W]hen patients are terminally ill, CPR might be futile in the sense
that although it might temporarily restore the patient's circulation and respira-
tion, death will soon ensue anyway either from the patient's underlying condition
or from another cardiac or pulmonary arrest.") (citations omitted).
83 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 64.
84 See MEISEL, supra note 35, at 551.
85 See Guidelines, supra note 27, at 7.
86 See MEiSEL, supra note 35, at 546.
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thought treatment would be futile.s7 Such unilateral actions
proved to be unacceptable.
"In 1974, the American Medical Association recommended
that decisions not to resuscitate a patient be formally entered
into the medical record, a practice that had already become
widespread."8 8 In the same year, the National Conference on
Standards for Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency
Cardiac Care issued a monograph stating that:
The purpose of cardiopulmonary resuscitation is the prevention
of sudden, unexpected death. Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation is
not indicated in certain situations, such as in cases of terminal
irreversible illness where death is not unexpected .... For hospi-
talized patients, the conference recommended noting the inap-
propriateness of CPR in the patient's progress notes as well as
providing a written order not to resuscitate for the benefit of
nurses and other personnel who may be called upon to initiate
or participate in cardiopulmonary resuscitation."
Additionally, legislation began to be enacted to regulate the use
of DNR orders. As Meisel points out, "[T]he dominant legisla-
tive purpose in enacting statutes authorizing and regulating
DNR orders is to assure health care professionals that in certain
situations it is appropriate and legal not to attempt
resuscitation. "90
Liability is of great concern to both hospitals and health care
workers. The legislative statutes are helpful in addressing this
issue. Typically, they provide that issuing or honoring a DNR
order is not the equivalent of euthanasia." l Part of the trade-off
87 See id. at 544.
Questions concerning the withholding or administration of CPR
frequently arise in hospitals and nursing homes. At one time, with-
holding CPR was considered to be so controversial that DNR orders
were not openly discussed and were often unwritten. This in turn
led, in at least one hospital, to procedures so shoddy that a grand
jury described them as "shocking procedural abuses." This kind of
concern and the need to clarify the procedures for writing DNR
orders led to the enactment of detailed statutes in a growing
number of states.
Id. (citations omitted).
88 LIEIERSON, supra note 9, at 491.
89 Id. (citation omitted).
90' MEISEL, supra note 35, at 555-56.
91 See id. at 576 ("Generally, the DNR statutes include provisions stating the
statute does not authorize mercy killing or euthanasia. This means that death
resulting from honoring an DNR order or directive is not the basis for the impo-
sition of civil or criminal liability."); see also SLOAN, supra note 35, at 53-59 (dis-
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for the protection the legislation affords physicians and hospi-
tals is the requirement of "informed consent" before a DNR or-
der is made.92 Unilateral decisions are no longer accepted.
This trend is made apparent in the case of Velez v. Bethune,93 in
which a doctor unilaterally discontinued life support resulting
in the death of a premature infant. The parents brought a
wrongful death suit claiming that the physician had not ob-
tained their informed consent to terminate life-sustaining meas-
ures for their child.94 The court held, "Dr. Velez had no right to
decide, unilaterally, to discontinue medical treatment even if, as
the record in this case reflects, the child was terminally ill and in
the process of dying. That decision must be made with the con-
sent of the parents."95
The legislation of out-of-hospital DNR orders naturally follows
this logic relating to the concern regarding liability. 9 When a
patient is not in the hospital setting, it is much more difficult to
control the resuscitation efforts or absence thereof of patients
that go into cardio-pulmonary failure. In a setting beyond the
campus of a hospital or nursing home, many questions arise as
to the treatment of DNR orders. These orders are also com-
monly referred to as "pre-hospital" DNRs.97 "The [DNR] order
cussing criminal liability facing physicians in situations where a physician may
choose not to treat a terminally ill patient).
92 See Guidelines, supra note 27, at 10.
Informed Consent: A legal term that refers to a person's consent to
a proposed medical intervention after being provided information
deemed relevant to that decision. The information that is legally
required includes: diagnosis, nature and purpose of proposed in-
tervention, risks and consequences of proposed treatment,
probability that the treatment will be successful, feasible treatment
alternatives, and prognosis if the treatment is not given.
Id.
91 466 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
N See id. at 628.
95 Id. at 629; see also In re Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3, 5 (Ga. 1992) (citation omitted)
(stating that "the right to refuse treatment or indeed to terminate treatment may
be exercised by the parents or legal guardian of the infant after diagnosis that the
infant is terminally ill with no hope of recovery .... ).
96 See ALAN D. LIEBERSON, ADVANCE MEDICAL DIREcrIVEs 240 (Supp. 1996).
A number of states have now passed legislation intended to extend
the use of DNR orders to out-patient situations. Under the pre-
scribed protocols, emergency personnel called to attend to such
identified patients are directed not to resuscitate the patient if a
cardio-pulmonary arrest has occurred and relieved of legal liability
for forsaking CPR.
Id.
97 See BERGER, supra note 31, at 73. Prehospital DNR orders:
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must be presented to the EMS personnel when they respond to
a call."98 The statutes described by Berger refer to EMS person-
nel when designating authority to honor a DNR order.99 A ca-
veat to this statement in relation to our "real world
hypothetical," posed previously, is whether the flight attendants
on-board an airplane in-flight could constitute "EMS personnel"
for purposes of the statute. Another problematic issue is the
presentation of the actual DNR order to the EMS personnel
when they respond to a call. If the order must be presented, it
naturally follows that there has to be a third party present in
addition to the patient and the EMS personnel because the pa-
tient would be unable in such a situation to present the docu-
ments to the EMS personnel himself. Additionally, the third
party must have knowledge of and easy access to, the DNR order
documentation for it to be effective. If a third party that meets
these requirements is not present, the patient will most likely be
resuscitated even though it is against his or her individual
wishes. This goes back to the earlier discussion of the timing
involved for successful CPR.
The requirement for presentation of the DNR order to EMS
personnel when they respond to a call is founded in public pol-
icy.1 °° EMS workers should not have to bear such a heavy weight
in these matters. In a case described by Leslie Nicholson, a wo-
man unsuccessfully sued a first aid squad, individual members of
the squad, a hospital and two paramedics for trying "to revive
her husband without her permission. '" 101
[a] llow EMS personnel, although obliged to save and maintain life,
to respect the wishes of those who choose to expire in their homes.
The statutes do not grant EMS personnel authority to honor living
wills; they allow them to honor a prehospital do-not-resuscitate or-
der which constitutes a determination regarding the patient's phys-
ical condition and course of treatment. The order, which must be
signed by the attending physician, directs EMS personnel to with-
hold CPR although they may provide the patient with limited medi-
cal care when they respond to a call for assistance.
Id.
98 Id. at 74.
99 See id.
WO See Leslie Nicholson, Under Examination, 13 MED. MALPRACTICE L. & STRAT-
EGY 8 (1996). ("Ellen Moskowitz, an attorney and ethicist at Briarcliff Manor,
N.Y.'s Hastings Center, a bioethics research group, said it would be 'unsound as a
matter of public health policy to have [EMS] workers forgoing life-prolonging
care based upon family requests."').
101 Id.
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The plaintiffs husband had a history of heart ailments and had
been hospitalized twice in the month before his death .... After
he collapsed at the couple's home, his wife called the first aid
squad and told the dispatcher her husband had died and she
needed assistance lifting his body to the bed, where it could re-
pose "with dignity" while awaiting a representative from the med-
ical examiner's office. Instead, upon arrival, rescue squad
members felt obligated by state-mandated procedures to perform
CPR, despite the wife's objections."1 2
Nicholson continues, "Medical Ethicists who commented on the
case said the ruling points to the need for people to stipulate in
advance their medical treatment preferences."....
State-by-state legislation is being enacted to help in these situ-
ations.' " Unless there is legislation on the subject, EMS workers
are not permitted to honor these DNR orders.' Therefore, the
question becomes not one of whether the EMS personnel are
allowed to act on an advance directive, but whether they would
honor an advance directive of their own volition, knowing the
liability they could potentially face.
Texas has recently passed legislation creating an out-of-hospi-
tal do not resuscitate statute.""° The statute's definition of "out-
of-hospital DNR order" provides a list of life-sustaining proce-
1112 Id. (referring to Mulligan v. Allamuchy-Green Township First Aid Squad,
146 N.J. 70 (1996)).
10' Id. ("Anna Moretti, a lawyer with Choice in Dying in NewYork, said a study
by the group found that EMS workers still have concerns about what they are
supposed to do, even when presented with a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order.").
104 See id. (However, there are only 27 states that currently have statutes recog-
nizing non-hospital DNR orders.).
105 See ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly (visited Sept. 14, 1996)
<http:www.abanet.org/elderly/psda.html> ("EMS personnel are generally re-
quired to institute cardio-pulmonary resuscitation and other life saving treatment
unless a doctor physically present instructs them not to do so. Without legislation
to permit them to comply with Advance Directives requesting no resuscitation,
EMS personnel have generally not followed Advance Directives."); see also Ste-
phen P. Williams et al., Do Not Resuscitate Orders and Emergency Medical Services, S.C.
LAW., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 21, 22.
[C]itizens with terminal illnesses continued to face problems re-
garding their wishes not to receive resuscitative treatment from
emergency medical personnel. Because of their statutory and regu-
latory duties, emergency medical services (EMS) workers could not
legally follow these directives and were required to always provide
resuscitative measures, in contravention of the patient's advance
directives.
Id.
106, See Thomas William Mayo, Health Care Law, 49 SMU L. Rv. 1089, 1113
(1996).
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dures that are not to be performed on a patient with such an
order. 117 The identity of a valid DNR order is provided through
the statute's address of identification devices. 0 The statute
provides that "[a] person who has a valid out-of-hospital DNR
order under this chapter may wear a DNR identification device
around the neck or on the wrist .... "109
The Texas statute refers to "responding health care profes-
sionals" throughout the code. The question then becomes, as
mentioned before in the hypothetical, would a flight attendant
qualify as a "responding health care professional"? In the stat-
ute's definition of a "health care professional," there does not
seem to be an inlet for an interpretation such as this." 0 This
could be to an advantage to airlines and flight attendants as far
as liability is concerned. It can be argued that, because they do
not fall under the statute's definition of "health care profession-
als" '' and because it is this group that the statute is addressing,
the airline and flight attendants may not be held to any particu-
lar standard of care. The only standard of care that they would
then be responsible for following would be the standard operat-
ing procedures of the airline itself. This analysis, however, ad-
dresses only legal standards, and does not focus on the ethical
standards that are most certainly involved also.
For a complete analysis, it is necessary to address common law
tort doctrine as well as the statutory provisions previously
discussed.
107 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 674.001 (14) (A) (Vernon Supp.
1997) (The procedures that are not to be initiated or continued are: "(i) cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation; (ii) endotracheal intubation or other means of ad-
vanced airway management; (iii) artificial ventilation; (iv) defibrillation; (v)
transcutaneous cardiac pacing; (vi) the administration of cardiac resuscitation
medications; and (vii) other life-sustaining procedures specified by the board
under Section 674.023(a) .....
108 See id. § 674.010(b).
The presence of a DNR identification device on the body of a per-
son is conclusive evidence that the person has executed or issued a
valid out-of-hospital DNR order or has a valid out-of-hospital DNR
order executed or issued on the person's behalf. Responding
health care professionals shall honor the DNR identification device
as if a valid out-of-hospital DNR order form executed or issued by
the person were found in the possession of the person.
Id.
109 Id. § 674.010(a).
110 See id. § 674.001 ("'Health care professionals' means physicians, nurses, and
emergency medical services personnel and, unless the context requires other-
wise, includes hospital emergency personnel.").
Ill See id.
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VII. TORT LAW DUTY TO ACT
Deeply rooted in the law of negligence is the difference be-
tween "misfeasance" and "non-feasance.""' 2 This is the differ-
ence between actively causing harm and passive inaction that
results in a harm.113 Consequently, the law has been slow in rec-
ognizing liability for non-feasance. 1 4 However, "[d]uring the
last century, liability for 'nonfeasance' has been extended still
further to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public
sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to find a
duty of affirmative action.""' 5 This liability has been imposed
"reluctantly"' 6 and
[b]ecause of this reluctance to countenance "nonfeasance" as a
basis of liability, the law has persistently refused to impose on a
stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the
aid of another human being who is in danger, even if the other is
in danger of losing his life.' 17
General laws that would impose "neighborly duties" seem to be
unpopular because of the possible infringement of personal pri-
11" See KEETON, supra note 72, at 373.
113 See id.
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by
"misfeasance" the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the
plaintiff, while by "non-feasance" he has at least made his situation
no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him by interfering in his
affairs.
Id. (citation omitted).
114 See id.; see also Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsychole-
gal Analysis, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 439, 446 (1994).
Anglo-American tort law generally provides that a person is under
no duty to help another avoid injury from a foreseeable risk, even if
helping would entail little or no risk or cost. The no-duty-to-act
rule has sometimes been restated in terms of the different legal
effects of nonfeasance and misfeasance. In these terms, the rule
provides that an actor is liable for negligent misfeasance, but not
for negligent nonfeasance.
Id.
115 KEETON, supra note 72, at 373-74.
116 See id. at 375.
117 Id. "The remedy in such cases is left to the 'higher law' and the 'voice of
conscience,' which, in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective
either to prevent the harm or to compensate the victim." Id. (citation omitted).
See also Galligan, supra note 113, at 448. "Although the non-actor may find pun-
ishment in the next life, his victim has no legal recourse in this one .... With
purely moral obligations the law does not deal." Id. Galligan continues,
"[u]nder the common law, one historical justification for holding a party liable
for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance was the difficulty in thinking of nonfea-
sance as causing injury." Id. (citation omitted).
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vacy. 118 This has proved unacceptable in many circumstances.
Thus, in limited situations-mostly those in which someone
holds themself out in a public position-a duty has been im-
posed by law. As such, "a carrier has been required to take rea-
sonable affirmative steps to aid a passenger in peril ... ,,'9 This
duty was originally intended for passengers of railroads and
buses, but should be easily translated to today's more modern
form of travel, airplanes.
Modern tort law also imposes a duty to act on employers and
other "caretakers." The master of a vessel must rescue a sailor in
his charge who falls overboard at sea, and ajailer must aid a pris-
oner. Similarly, a teacher has an obligation to exercise reason-
able care to protect her students.'2 0
These are all duties in which a party depends upon another to
give care.1 2 1 It seems that the role of a flight attendant would
fall into line with those upon whom a duty has been imposed. A
flight attendant could be considered a "caretaker" as it is her
responsibility to provide for the care and safety of the passen-
gers during their trip. Passengers are dependent upon a flight
attendant for guidance and direction in much the same way that
a student is dependent upon his teacher. For these reasons, in
118 See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1993).
Laws that attempt to balance autonomy and a minimally acceptable
level of neighborliness by imposing affirmative duties to help
others are unpopular because they interfere with personal auton-
omy and the American "obsession with privacy." Even the most
well-intentioned balance seems to prefer soulless individualism to
creeping involuntary servitude and "unforeseen partnership."
Id. (citations omitted).
119 KEATON, supra note 72, at 376; see Galligan, supra note 113, at 449-50 ("The
common law imposes a duty to aid wherever a special relationship exists between
the potential actor and the victim. Even in the early days of the common law
those who undertook a public calling were obligated to protect their custom-
ers."); see also Korn v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 133 S.E.2d 616 (Ga. Ct. App.
1963) (finding duty breached where bus driver knew of passenger's handicap,
failed to warn her about step outside bus terminal, and failed to get medical
assistance after passenger was injured). This scenario can be read to impose lia-
bility if the flight attendant in our hypothetical tries to resuscitate the passenger
as the flight attendant is on notice of the out-of-hospital DNR order and fails to
take the appropriate action (or non-action) if the passenger goes into cardiac-
arrest.
120 Galligan, supra note 113, at 450.
121 See Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L.
REv. 547, 557 (1988). "Relationships in which one party depends on the other to
provide care often gives rise to a criminally enforceable duty to provide such
care." Id.
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addition to the fact that a common carrier is responsible for its
passengers, a flight attendant would be the most appropriate
person to render care to a passenger during an in-flight occur-
rence. Hence, if an ordinary passenger were to go into cardiac
arrest or need any other emergency medical treatment a flight
attendant would have an affirmative duty to provide care to the
best of her ability. 122 Our hypothetical situation, however, is the
direct inverse of this scenario.
In our situation, a passenger is requesting NOT to be cared
for. Disregarding the legislation regarding the honor of out-of-
hospital DNR orders, a flight attendant would have the duty to
resuscitate. However, taking into account the possible legisla-
tion and the passenger's request, would the duty take a 180-de-
gree turn into a duty not to resuscitate? Does a statutory duty
trump the common law duty to assist?
In considering these questions, it is interesting to ask why one
would come to the assistance of another. Is it for altruistic1 23
reasons, or does a person aid another in peril to further his own
self interest?' 24 The determination of such motivation is key in
the creation and application of tort law.' 25
In our hypothetical, it should be clear that a flight attendant
would perform a self-serving action by ignoring the passenger's
2 See KEETON, supra note 72, at 377.
Where the duty to rescue is required, it is agreed that it calls for
nothing more than reasonable care under the circumstances ....
He will seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he
reasonably can, and take reasonable steps to turn the sick person
over to a doctor or to those who will look after him until one can be
brought.
Id.
123 See MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 34 (10th ed. 1996) (defin-
ing altruism as "unselfish regard or devotion to the welfare of others").
1 See Galligan, supra note 113, at 474. "I examine why people help others. Do
they help to further their own self-interest or do they help altruistically, out of a
desire to help another?" Id.
125 See id. at 475.
Tort law depends, in part, on why people do what they do. To
the degree that people act out of self-interest, tort rules premised
on deterrence can be very effective. A rule threatening liability may
trigger beneficent, or at least efficient, behavior.
If people act out of altruism, however, what is the need for legal
rules? . . . Therefore, recognizing a duty to act when people might
be expected to act, albeit altruistically, is to state something about
human nature, to expressly recognize our capacity for compassion,
something the law has not typically done.
Id. (citations omitted).
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valid out-of-hospital DNR order and initiating a rescue. The
flight attendant would try to resuscitate the passenger, not out
of duty to the passenger (as duty to the passenger would require
affirmative non-action) but out of duty to the flight attendant's
own needs-whether they be moral or ethical problems with al-
lowing someone to die right before them or a mere guilty con-
science. However, the act of resuscitation is what should give
the flight attendant a guilty conscience in this situation.
Through the out-of-hospital do not resuscitate order the passen-
ger has given explicit instructions not to be resuscitated if he
goes into cardio-pulmonary arrest. As such, the moral decision
should be to not resuscitate. Additionally, with legislation in
place giving out-of-hospital do not resuscitate orders validity, the
liability could be placed upon the person who does not honor
the order. Determination of such liability, however, is depen-
dent upon the state legislation of the matter. The choice of law
is therefore of crucial importance as some states may impose
liability while others may not.
VIII. JURISDICTION
A major question for the application of state statutes to the
issue of out-of-hospital DNR orders on airplanes is that of juris-
diction. Jurisdiction and choice of law questions could prove
integral to the determination of liability, which is of extreme
importance to both the airlines and the flight attendants in-
volved in such situations. So, in exactly which jurisdiction is a
plane in-flight deemed to be?
The available caselaw seems to indicate that the passengers
aboard an airplane are in the jurisdiction of the airspace in
which the plane is flying. In Grace v. MacArthur,12 6 the court was
asked to decide whether "the passengers on a commercial air-
craft are within the territorial limits of the State over which the
plane happens to be flying at a particular time.' 27 The court
found that "it is clear that an aircraft flying over a State is within
that State and is subject to its jurisdiction."'' 2' The policy behind
such a decision may be seen in the policy presented by Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co.129 In its opinion, the court stated that
"[i] t is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they possess
126 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
127 Id. at 444.
128 Id.
129 170 N.E. 385 (Mass. 1930).
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jurisdiction to control the air space above their territories. It
seems to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-pro-
tection."'3 ° It seems, therefore, that even if an airplane took off
in Dallas and was scheduled to land in New York, it would not
necessarily be classified as being in Texas or New York for the
entirety of the trip. If it were flying over Tennessee en route,
even though 30,000 feet above the ground, it would be in the
jurisdiction of Tennessee because it was operating in Tennes-
see's airspace.
On point as to jurisdiction in a tort action, the court in Grace
states, "a number of the States have adopted the Uniform Aero-
nautics Act . . . . Section 74-111 provides that all crimes, torts,
and other wrongs committed by or against a pilot or passengers
while in flight over the lands and waters of the State shall be
governed by its laws .. .
This leads to the presumption that, in application to the ear-
lier stated hypothetical, the flight crew of an in-flight plane
could be held accountable for the requirements provided by a
specific state's DNR statute if the state has legislated on that is-
sue. 112 This would appear to place a substantial burden on air-
line crews to be versed in the legislations of each state over
which they fly. For this reason, it would seem fruitful for airlines
to devise standard procedures to be used at all times in these
situations-whereby the standard procedure would mesh with
all jurisdictional requirements.
The court in Grace addressed another valid issue, "Apart from
any supposed effect of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, . . . an
aircraft flying over a State is within that State and is subject to its
jurisdiction."'33 Thus, choice of law issues become of great
importance.
IX. CHOICE OF LAW
Eugene Scoles provides a description of the concept of con-
flict of laws:
130 Id. at 389.
131 Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 445.
132 At this point, I am analyzing the hypothetical in segments. This does not
mean that when the variables of the problem are put together that this particular
point will be persuasive.
133 Grace, 170 F. Supp. at 444 (referring to the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49
U.S.C. § 171, as amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 401).
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The term "Conflict of Laws" describes generally the body of law
dealing with the questions of when and why the courts of one
jurisdiction take into consideration the elements of law or fact
patterns in a case or consider the prior determination of another
state or of a foreign nation in a case pending before them ....
[I] t is not uncommon to say that the substantive rules of decision
of two states related to a transaction are "in conflict" when there
are circumstances which apparently justify the application of the
rule of either state.1 3 4
Our focus pushes us toward an examination of the choice of law
issues surrounding tort liability. 3 ' The traditional approach to
choice of law in tort cases has been a territorial one.136 "The
fortuitous place of injury thus became all-important. 1 37
There are varied justifications for this territorial approach to
the choice of law in a given situation. David Cavers gives an
overview of these reasons in his book, The Choice of Law Process.138
Cavers expresses the first reason as not allowing a visitor to a
territory's greater privileges while also not holding him to the
higher standard of liability that accompanies wrongdoing in the
territory. 39
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard
of conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the
laws of the state where the person causing the injury has acted or
had his home, the laws of the state of injury should determine
134 EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAws § 11, at 1, 2 (1982)
(emphasis omitted).
135 See id. § 17.21, at 587-88. "[T]ort issues are to be determined by the law of
the state which has the 'most significant relationship' to the occurrence and the
parties." Id.
136 See id. § 17.2, at 552-53.
The territorialist approach, the vested rights theory, dominated
American conflicts law during the first half of this century and be-
came the cornerstone of the First Restatement, including its choice-
of-law rules for tort. The place where the last event necessary to
make the actor liable occurred was the place of the wrong and thus
the source of the governing law: the law of the place of the wrong
(lex loci delicti commissi). The place of the wrong is usually the place
where the injury occurred because liability does not arise absent
injury.
Id. § 17.2, at 552.
137 Id. § 17.2, at 553.
138 DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 139-40 (1965).
1319 See id. at 141. "The defendant who is held to the higher standard is not an
apt subject forjudicial solicitude. He cannot fairly claim to enjoy whatever bene-
fits a state may offer those who enter its bounds and at the same time claim
exemption from the burdens." Id.
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the standard and the protection applicable to the case, at least
where the person injured was not so related to the person caus-
ing the injury that the question should be relegated to the law
governing their relationship.140
A state undertakes a perspective such as this to provide for the
"general security" of its citizens. 4 '
Cavers articulates his second theory, which is similar to his
first in that it is concerned with standards of conduct provided
by the state.
Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted
and caused an injury set a lower standard of conduct or of finan-
cial protection than do the laws of the home state of the person
suffering the injury, the laws of the state of conduct and injury
should determine the standard of conduct or protection applica-
ble to the case, at least where the person injured was not so re-
lated to the person causing the injury that the question should
be relegated to the law governing the relationship.142
In this theory there is concern for the people whose activities
might cause the harm as well as for those actually harmed.14
Here we look to the state's consideration of conduct as wrong-
ful. '44 This appears to be an especially intriguing theory in rela-
tion to our look into the liability that would potentially face a
flight attendant who resuscitated a patient against their DNR or-
der or who did not resuscitate when the situation mandated that
they should engage in heroic measures. This type of conflicts
theory would be favored by the flight attendants, as it would al-
low them more flexibility in their actions. They would not nec-
essarily be bound by the law of the state in which the order was
issued, as the cardio-pulmonary arrest could occur within an-
other jurisdiction during travel, and that jurisdiction's laws
could be radically different from the one in which the order was
issued. Thereby, while one state would call for resuscitation, an-
other may recognize the order and find tort liability for a resus-
citation. This particular theory meshes with the current policy
140 /d. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
1,41 See id. at 139-40. "Our territorially organized governments undertake by
means of laws and regulations governing conduct to provide for 'the general
security,' to use Dean Pound's term, to safeguard the health and safety of people
and property within their bounds." Id. (citations omitted).
14, See id. at 146 (emphasis omitted).
143 See id.
1,14 See id. at 152. "Its laws may reflect a purpose to encourage risk-taking by
relieving activities in a certain field from the hazard of civil liability either entirely
or at least until the case against the way they are conducted is a clear one." Id.
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of our hypothetical airline," 5 stating that the flight attendant
should resuscitate first and ask questions later if unclear about
any aspect of the situation.
Cavers's third theory addresses specialized regulation.
Where the state in which a defendant acted has established spe-
cial controls, including the sanction of civil liability, over conduct
of the kind in which the defendant was engaged when he caused
a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff in another state, the plaintiff,
though having no relationship to defendant, should be accorded
the benefit of the special standards of conduct and of financial
protection in the state of the defendant's conduct, even though
the state of injury had imposed no such controls or sanctions. 146
X. CONCLUSION
In attempting to tie the main issues of this topic together, it
becomes obvious that any solution hypothesized will be highly
indeterminative as so much hinges upon the DNR legislation of
individual states. However, regardless of what the applicable
state statute mandates, it is highly unlikely that, in any circum-
stance, a flight attendant will watch a passenger go into cardiac
arrest without attempting to come to her aid. This scenario nar-
rows the issue to the main underlying theory-moral choice.
Although a flight attendant may make her own moral choice to
resuscitate a passenger, should the flight attendant realize that a
terminally ill passenger should be able to exercise his own moral
choice in not wanting to be resuscitated? It is a sad state, how-
ever, that fear of liability will often times negate the moral
choice made by a terminally ill patient.
145 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
146 CAVERS, supra note 137, at 159 (emphasis omitted).
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